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NOTES
STATE COMPENSATION ACTS AND INTER-
STATE COMMERCE.
The question whether state Workmen's Compensation Acts can
under any circumstances affect railroad employes who are injured
while they are engaged in interstate commerce is answered differ-
ently in the recent decisions of four state courts. In Staley v. The
Illinois Central Railroad Co., 109 N. E. 342, and Smith v. Industrial
Accident Commission of California, 147 Pac. 600, the Supreme
Court of Illinois and the California Court of Appeals respectively
hold that the federal Employers' Liability Act supersedes all state
legislation which might previously have been held to apply to injuries
to interstate railroad employes, while a narrower view of the scope
of the federal statute is taken in Rounsaville v. Central Railroad of
New Jersey, 94 Atl. 392 (New Jersey), and Winfield v. New York
Central & Hudson River Railroad Co., 153 N. Y. Supp. 499 (New
York App. Div.). All of the foregoing cases were actions to recover
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compensation under state statutes for injuries received while the
plaintiffs were concededly engaged in interstate commerce under the
rulings of the United States Supreme Court.1 In none of them was
there any evidence of negligence on the part of the carrier's servants
or agents.
Each of the cases recognizes the well-settled doctrine that, al-
though Congress by the Constitution is given exclusive power to
regulate commerce between the states, until Congress acts in certain
particulars the individual states under their general police power
may pass laws which may incidentally affect interstate commerce,
so long as no direct burden upon it is imposed. The New York and
the New Jersey courts emphasize the fact that the federal Liability
Act permits a recovery only in cases where there is negligence by
the railroad company's agents or employes and that the statute is
entitled "An act relating to the liability of common carriers by rail-
road to their employes in certain cases." This, they hold, shows
an intention on the part of Congress to leave cases of injuries in-
curred by interstate railroad employes under other circumstances
where no negligence can be shown to local regulations. In support
of this view they also state that whereas the federal statute contem-
plates a remedy ex delicto, abolishing certain common-law defenses
to actions for negligence, .the real purpose of the state statutes is
to take care of workmen under a state system of insurance or pen-
sion scheme to secure the benefits of which the law implies certain
provisions in every contract of employment governed by the acts, a
new right of action and new methods of procedure being established
for its enforcement.
This particular question has never been, directly passed upon by
the federal Supreme Court, but the California and the Illinois courts
refer to many statements casting doubt upon the rule announced
in the New Jersey and New York opinions which are found
in numerous decisions of the highest federal tribunal con-
struing the Federal Employers' Liability Act.2  Many of
Pederson v. Railroad Co., 229 U. S. 146, 33 Sup. Ct. 648, 58 L. Ed. 1125,
Ann. Cas. 1914C 153; Railway Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 33 Sup. Ct. 651,
57 L. Ed. 1129, Ann. Cas. 1914C 156; Railroad Co. v. United States, 231
U. S. 112, 34 Sup. Ct. 26, 58 L. Ed. 144.
2Mondou v. Railroad Co., 223 U. S. 1, 51, 54, 32 Sup. Ct. 135, 137, 38 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 44; Railroad Co. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570, 576, 33 Sup. Ct. 135,
137, 57 L. Ed. 355, Ann. Cas. 1914B 134; Railroad Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S.
59, 65, 33 Sup. Ct. 192, 193, 57 L. Ed. 417, Ann. Cas. 1914C 176; Railroad Co.
v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248, 256, 34 Sup. Ct. 305, 307, 58 L. Ed. 591, Ann. Cas.
1914C 159; Railway Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 501, 34 Sup. Ct. 635, 638, 58
L. Ed. 1062; Railroad Co. v. Hayes, 234 U. S. 86, 89, 34 Sup. Ct. 729, 58 L.
Ed. 1226.
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these are quoted by the Illinois court in the Staley
case, where the question is treated at considerable length. The
conclusion in the latter case is "that the 'particular subject,' 'subject-
matter,' 'field,' or 'chosen field' taken possession of by the federal
Employers' Liability Act was the employers' liability for injuries to
employes in interstate transportation by rail, and the real question
* * * is whether the injury for which the suit was brought was
sustained while the company and the injured employe were engaged
in interstate commerce. * * * The field of liability as to employes
injured while engaged in interstate commerce on railroads is occu-
pied exclusively by the federal Employers' Liability Act-and that,
too, regardless of the negligence or lack of negligence of either party
to the litigation." The Illinois court think that the words "certain
cases" in the title of the federal act are meant to confine its applica-
tion to cases arising in interstate commerce, since the first Employ-
ers' Liability Act was declared unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court because it attempted to regulate the relation of mas-
ter and servant in intrastate commerce. While conceding that its con-
struction will leave injured interstate employes without a remedy
where no negligence on the part of the carrier can be proved-a
state of affairs "contrary to the spirit of the times, which demands
humane legislation covering this subject"--the court says that this is
an argument which should be more properly addressed to the fed-
eral Congress.
A practical argument in favor of the construction adopted in the
Staley case is found in a dissenting opinion in the case of Winfield
v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., supra. The learned presiding justice
therein states that under the rule laid down by the majority of the
court the defendant railroad company in order to escape liability
under the state statute would be forced to admit its negligence and
"it would be unreasonable to compel the employer to prove his own
negligence to show that the case was one within which the rule of
liability was established by the federal law. The result would be
in most cases to give to the injured party an option to claim under
the compensation act or under the federal liability law."
H.H.
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